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inancial liberalization involves
the elimination of credit
controls, deregulation of
interest rates, easing of entry into the
f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s i n d u s t r y,
development of capital markets,
increased prudential regulation and
supervision, and liberalization of
international capital flows. Reforms
are expected to increase competitive
efficiency within the financial market
in at least three ways. Number one,
the elimination of regulations and
price distortions allow savings to be
directed into highest-yielding (riskadjusted) forms of investment
(improved allocative efficiency).
Number two, increased competition
reduces the cost of financial
intermediation (higher operational
efficiency). Number three, the reform
measures generate an improved
range of financial products and
services adaptable to changing
consumer needs (dynamic
efficiency). Although financial reforms
can increase the efficiency by
channeling resources into productive
use, its impact on the quantity of
savings is theoretically ambiguous.
From an analytical point of view, the

impact of financial reform on savings
includes a direct, short-term, and an
indirect, long term, effect. The direct
effect works through the price and
quantity channels. The price channel
reflects the impact of reforms on
savings through changes in the real
interest rates. Fry (1978, 1995)
reports that, across a sample of
fourteen Asian countries, the gross
national savings rate is positively
affected higher real interest rates.
However, the positive response is
small and diminishes in later years.
(Reynoso, 1989) finds that savings
increase rapidly as real interest rates
move from sharply negative to just
below zero, but that the effect levels
off at low positive real interest rates
and becomes negative as interest rate
rises. This raises the possibility of a
nonlinear relationship between
interest rates and savings, perhaps
involving threshold effects.
The quantity channel affects savings
by expanding the supply of credit to
credit-constrained consumers. A
number of studies have argued that
the high level of savings evident in the
East Asian countries and Japan can
be attributed not to high interest rates
but to bank expansion in rural areas
and the availability of low-yielding but
safe deposit instruments (Loayza et
al., 2000).They estimated that a one
percentage point increase in the ratio
of private credit flows to income
reduces the long-term private saving
rate.. This seems to indicate that the
expansion of credit reduces private
savings as economic agents are able
to finance increased consumption at
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their current income level.
Financial liberalization, which leads to
large capital flows, can also have
short term implications for savings.
Bandiera et al. (2000) have argued
that the impact on savings of financial
liberalization comes through the
related changes in the availability and
cost of credit, expected income
growth, and increased wealth due to
higher property values.
Stulz (1999) and Mishkin (2001)
assert that financial liberalization
promotes transparency and
accountability, reducing adverse
selection and moral hazard while
alleviating liquidity problems in
financial markets. These authors
argue that international capital
markets help to discipline policy
makers, who might be tempted to
exploit an otherwise confined
domestic capital market. The prime
benefits that the literature associates
with liberalised financial system to the
users of the financial services include;
the reduction in the cost of services to
both savers and borrowers with the
introduction of more competition and
improvements in services from more
efficient, customer friendly financial
institutions. Savers expect to receive
higher rates of return, a broader
choice of saving instruments and
easier access to financial products.
Borrowers benefit from more accurate
appraisal of risk; reduced waiting
period and expanded access to funds
through more sophisticated lending
instruments available in a wider range
of maturities. The benefits of financial
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liberalization can therefore be
grouped into increased access to
domestic and international capital
markets, and increased efficiency of
capital allocation.
However critics of financial
liberalization policies have contended
that the efficient markets concept is
fundamentally misleading when
applied to capital flows. In the theory
of the second best, removing one
distortion need not be welfare
enhancing when other distortions are
present. If the capital account is
liberalized while import competing
industries are still protected, for
example, or if there is a downwardly
inflexible real wage, capital may flow
into sectors in which the country has a
comparative disadvantage, implying a
reduction in welfare.
If information asymmetries are rife to
financial markets and transactions, in
particular in countries with poor
corporate governance and low legal
protections, there is no reason to think
that financial liberalization, either
domestic or international, will be
welfare improving (Stiglitz, 2000).
Furthermore, in countries where the
capacity to honour contracts and to
assemble information relevant to
financial transactions is least
developed, there can be no
assumption that capital will flow into
uses where its marginal product
exceeds its opportunity cost. Stiglitz
(1994) argues in favour of certain
forms of financial repression. He
claims that repression can have
several positive effects such as:
improving the average quality of the
pool of loan applicants by lowering
interest rates; increasing firm equity
by lowering the price of capital; and
accelerating the rate of growth if credit
is targeted towards profitable sectors
such as exporters or sectors with high
technological spillovers. However,
these claims can be doubtful given
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that they increase the power of
bureaucrats, who can be less capable
than imperfect markets, to allocate
financial resources. The key
argument is that the government is, to
all intents and purposes, the insurer of
the financial systems, and hence a
financial failure can have significant
fiscal repercussions.
Overall, although financial reform
promises immense benefits, it could
also set in motion a process of change
that imposes some costs, which if not
covered carefully can result in a crisis.
The path toward greater efficiency in
financial services, like the path toward
freer trade, implies the closure of
those firms that remain unproductive
and the gradual emergence of new
practices. These new practices
include modern supervision and
regulation and the abandonment of
the special relationships and poor
lending practices that bear so much
responsibility for the dismal state of
financial sectors in most developing
countries. Like trade in goods,
competition will bring net benefits, but
those who enjoyed protection will
suffer and will try to oppose change.
Since the 1980s many emerging
economies, including Nigeria
embraced financial sector reforms
and have had mixed results (Akyuz
and Kotte, 1991). Starting in 1986,
Nigeria's financial system began to be
deregulated and by 1992 substantial
changes had taken place. Consistent
with trends in other developing
countries, institutions and markets are
growing and developing, leading to an
increasing role being played by the
financial system in the development of
Nigeria's economy.
The main objective of this paper is to
assess the impact of financial sector
reforms on savings mobilization in
Nigeria. Accordingly, the remaining
part of the paper is organized as
53

follows; part two dwells on theoretical
issues and brief review of literature.
Part three contains a brief analysis of
financial sector reforms in Nigeria,
while part four assesses the impact of
the reforms on savings. Summary,
conclusion and recommendations are
presented in part five.
2.0

Theoretical Issues and
Review of Literature

One element of the Mackinnon-Shaw
thesis is that abolition of ceilings on
interest rates stimulates savings.
Increased interest rates, however,
may reduce rather than increase the
volume of savings for a number of
reasons. First, the negative income
effect of increased interest rates might
offset the positive substitution effect
between consumption and savings.
Second, an increase in the real
interest rate may merely reallocate the
existing volume of savings in favour of
financial savings as opposed to other
forms of savings and leave the total
volume of savings unchanged (Gupta
1984, Rangarajan 1997). Such a
reallocation may also occur if reforms
provide a new range of financial
instruments such as shares, mutual
funds, postal savings and pension
funds.
Third, at very low levels of income
interest rates are unlikely to stimulate
savings since the totality of incomes
would be devoted to consumption.
Statistical evidence on the issue
suggests that a one percent increase
in the real interest rate raises the
saving rate by only about one-tenth of
one percentage point in the relatively
poor countries, where as this
coefficient is about two-thirds of one
percentage point in the relatively rich
countries (Ogaki et al 1996). Fourth,
even at relatively high levels of
income, financial reforms which ease
borrowing constraints may stimulate
consumption rather than savings (Hall
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1978, Jappelli and Pagano, 1989,
1994).
Finally, increased interest rates may
restrict the ability of the corporate
sector to restructure production
methods and hence its productivity
and growth. And if the savings
propensity of the household sector is
lower than that of the corporate sector
total savings may decline (Singh,
1993).
On theoretical grounds, it has been
postulated that a relaxation of liquidity
constraints will be associated with a
consumption boom and a decline in
aggregate saving. More specifically,
Campbell and Mankiw (1990)
postulated that there are two types of
households in the economy: the first
type of household, x, is liquidity
constrained and their consumption is
entirely determined by the evolution of
current income, while the second type
(1 -x), has free access to capital
markets and can smooth their
consumption inter-temporarily. Such
a theoretical development led these
authors to challenge the implicit
McKinnon-Shaw assumptions that
were based on a homogenous
household set in which it was
assumed that all relevant households
had free access to capital markets
within the domestic economy. This
argument stemmed from the StoneGeary utility function where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
which determines the sensitivity of
consumption to real interest rates, is
determined by permanent income and
subsistence consumption. Thus,
increases in real interest rates will
affect consumption/saving decisions
in varying degrees. In countries where
the representative household is close
to subsistence consumption (and
saving), they may not be sensitive to
changes in the real rate of interest.
Only in wealthier countries would
consumption decline (and saving
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increase) following an increase in real
interest rates. Hence, in this analysis
the magnitude of the increase in
saving following the higher real
interest rates associated with financial
liberalization will depend on the level
of income.
Financial reforms, however, may
stimulate financial savings in other
ways than through an increase in
interest rates. A reduction in controls
on the financial system along with
increased competition and improved
customer service may result in
increased savings. Access to savings
instruments may not only enhance the
willingness to save but also result in
the substitution of financial savings for
investments in assets such as gold
and jewellery. One other aspect of
financial reforms, which may
influence household savings, is
taxation. Reforms which reduce high
marginal income tax rates and
increase disposable incomes may not
only serve to eliminate tax evasion but
also stimulate savings. Tax reforms
designed to reduce tariffs on trade
and excise duties, however, may
encourage consumption and reduce
savings.
Yet another issue which has aroused
considerable discussion relates to the
impact of reforms on public savings
defined to include current surpluses of
public administration and publicly
owned enterprises. The seemingly
obvious proposition here is that
reforms which tend to reduce the
profligacy of the public sector would
increase public savings and hence
total savings. The much discussed
Ricardian equivalence theorem,
however, argues that an increase in
public savings may be offset by an
equivalent reduction in private
savings leaving the total volume of
savings unchanged. The Ricardian
equivalence theorem rests on a
number of assumptions such as well54

functioning capital markets, perfect
information, an independent banking
sector free of government imposed
restrictions, none of which may hold in
developing countries. In any case,
empirical evidence in support of the
theorem is weak. Most studies detect
a very weak negative relationship
between public and private savings
(Edwards 1995, Corbo and SchmidtHebbel 1991). Indeed, increased
public savings may promote total
volume of savings. The experience of
the East Asian countries suggests as
much.
Most studies on economic
liberalization analyze the impact of
exports and foreign direct investment
on growth, but not on savings
(Greenaway et al 1997). It is likely that
relatively liberal foreign trade regimes
promote savings. Typically, the
savings rate tends to be high in
relatively open economies such as the
East Asian economies. Liberal foreign
trade regimes may promote savings
for a number of reasons. Import
competition may serve to reduce the
prices of consumer durables, so too
would increase flows of foreign
investment in these industries. The
resulting increase in real incomes may
promote savings, provided both the
income and substitution effects of a
growth in income work in favour of
savings as opposed to consumption.
Liberalization of the foreign trade
regime may promote competition and
efficiency with a benign impact on
growth and hence savings. Also,
increased exports may result in
increased savings if the propensity to
save from export incomes is relatively
high. Equally remittances from
expatriates abroad may increase with
economic reforms, as has happened
in Nigeria, and promote savings.
The empirical results, however, have
not been consistent across countries.
Hussain (1996) estimated that, in the
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three years following reforms, savings
in Egypt increased by about 6 percent
of GDP over the level that would have
occurred in the absence of financial
liberalization. However, Bayoumi
(1993a) showed that financial
deregulation in the United Kingdom
led to a decline in the personal
savings ratio of 2.3 percentage points
over the 1980s. Chapple (1991) also
reported a decline in both household
and corporate savings in New
Zealand following liberalization.
Evidence from Turkey during the
1970s and 1980s demonstrated that a
negative income effect from higher
interest rates outweighed the positive
substitution effect on the private
savings rate (Uygur, 1993).
Financial liberalization has also been
shown to lead to consumption boom
and consumer lending in a number of
countries, including, the United
Kingdom (Bayoumi, 1993b), Mexico,
and Thailand. Using the overlapping
generation framework, Bayoumi
(1993b) has shown that a move from a
financially regulated to a deregulated
system will make savings more
sensitive to changes in income,
wealth, demographics, and real
interest rates. In addition, there will be
a transitional decline in savings
associated with higher real interest
rates and a larger current account
deficit. While transitional, the duration
of this effect depends upon
overlapping generations within the
economy. In summary, there is
conflicting evidence in the literature
regarding the impact of financial
liberalization and savings
mobilization.
In sum, there are no settled
conclusions on the impact of financial
liberalization on the savings rate. The
one proposition which seems to be
robust is that liberalization is likely to
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promote savings because of its
impact on growth and not the other
way round. Nigeria's experience
provides an opportunity to test this
proposition. Unfortunately, not all of
the propositions in the literature on
economic liberalization and savings
can be empirically tested. Some of the
variables cannot be quantified, and for
some others data in the required form
are not available. This study utilizes
available data for Nigeria to assess
the impact of financial sector reforms
on savings mobilization.
3.0

Financial Sector Reforms
in Nigeria2

At the commencement of
comprehensive financial sector
reform in Nigeria in 1987, the sector
was highly repressed. Interest rate
controls, selective credit guidelines,
ceilings on credit expansion and use
of reserve requirements and other
direct monetary control instruments
were archetypal characteristics of the
financial system. Access into banking
business was limited and
government-owned banks dominated
the industry. The reform of the foreign
exchange market which until then was
also controlled began in 1986. Indeed
the financial sector reform was a
component of the comprehensive
economic reforms programme,
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)
which was adopted in 1986.
The main financial sector reform
policies applied were deregulation of
interest rates, exchange rate and
access into banking business. Other
reform measures included,
establishment of Nigeria Deposit
Insurance Corporation, strengthening
the regulatory and supervisory
institutions, upward review of capital
adequacy standards, capital market
deregulation and introduction of
indirect monetary policy instruments.

2

This section benefited immensely from Onwioduokit and Adamu (2005).
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Some distressed banks were
liquidated while the central bank took
over the management of others.
Government share holdings in some
banks were also sold to the private
sector. (See Nnana, 2002 for the
details and the sequencing of the
reform measures)
The Central Bank of Nigeria made
attempts at restructuring the financial
system prior to the introduction of
open market operations in 1993. Bank
deposit and lending rates were
deregulated at the beginning of the
structural adjustment programme in
1987. In 1991, the CBN in a reaction to
rising nominal lending rates in the
market for loans prescribed a
maximum margin between the bank's
average cost of funds and their
maximum lending rates as well as a
minimum level for their savings
deposit rates. Interest rate
determination was still supposed to be
market-related through its link to the
cost of funds.
In order to promote competition in the
money market, the procedure for
licensing new banks was streamlined
and liberalised. Consequently, the
number of banking institutions
increased from 50 in 1987 to 120 in
1993, dropped to 115 in 1996. By
1998, the number of banks surged to
155, however in 2004, the number
plummeted to 89. An auction-based
system for issuing treasury bills and
certificates (both government debt
instruments) and the issue of these
instruments as Treasury bearer bonds
to enhance tradability was introduced.
This delinking of the treasury bill rate
from the MRR was aimed at improving
the efficiency of public debt
management and the conduct of
monetary policy, enhancement of
investor interest and involvement in
the holding of government debt
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instruments, promoting greater
reliance on market forces in the
determination of yields on the
instruments and encouraging the
development of the secondary market
for government short-term debt
instruments.
The CBN Decree No. 24 and The
Banks and Other Financial Institutions
Decree (BOFID) No. 25 were
promulgated in 1991. The Decrees
enhanced the central Bank of
Nigeria's independence in the
conduct of monetary policy,
augmented the CBN's regulatory and
supervisory power over banks and
brought under the purview of the CBN
the licensing and supervision of other
non-financial institutions like Discount
and Finance Houses. The Decrees
empowered the central bank to apply
indirect monetary policy instruments
such as open market operations
(OMO), reserve requirements,
stabilisation securities and special
deposits to achieve the objectives of
monetary policy.
Furthermore, prudential guidelines
regarding ample provisions for bad
and doubtful debts and loan
classification, interest capitalisation,
capital adequacy and limits on loan
concentration were put in place in
1990. In order to mitigate the adverse
effects of the implementation of the
guidelines on banks' balance sheets,
the central bank later allowed banks to
write off accumulated bad and
doubtful debts over a phased period of
four years. Steps were also taken to
strengthen the capital bases of banks.
The minimum paid-up capital of banks
was increased from N20, 000,000 to
N50, 000,000 million in the case of
commercial banks and N12, 000,000
to N40, 000,000 million in the case of
merchant banks with effect from June
1992. In 2001, the central bank of
Nigeria adopted the universal banking
policy, thereby abrogating the

Jan./Mar. 2006

classification of banks by the nature of
their business that existed hitherto.
Again to ensure that banking
contribute to the real economy and not
just serve as trading post, the Central
bank of Nigeria increased the required
capital of banks to N25.00 billion
effective December, 2005.
In order to facilitate the development
of a secondary market for government
debt instruments so as to reducing
government dependence on the CBN
financing of its deficit, three discount
houses were licensed in 1992. In
addition to intermediating funds
among financial institutions, the
discount houses were also expected
to promote primary and secondary
markets for government securities.
In 1990, the central bank in
conjunction with the Nigerian Deposit
Insurance Corporation (NDIC)
commenced the process of bank
restructuring. At first, six insolvent
banks were identified and were
allowed self-restructuring under the
close supervision of the two
supervisory authorities, the CBN and
NDIC. In late 1992, a joint committee
of the CBN and NDIC involving a
sector of the BOFID assumed greater
control over distressed banks. Banks
thus taken over by the CBN had their
board of directors dissolved and an
interim management board appointed
to exercise powers normally vested in
a board of directors of a bank and
some turn-around measures,
including the down-sizing of
operations through rationalisation of
staff and branch-network. The Boards
are also empowered to appoint
independent firms of auditors to
ascertain the true financial condition
of each of the banks. Thereafter,
appropriate restructuring or
liquidation options were to be
adopted.
However, in September 1992, credit
ceilings on banks that are adjudged
56

healthy by the CBN were lifted. A bank
was considered healthy if it met CBN
guidelines on certain specified criteria
in the preceding three months. These
criteria were; cash reserve, liquidity
ratio, prudential guidelines, statutory
minimum paid-up capital, capital
adequacy ratio, and sound
management. With the application of
these criteria about 80 banks were
endorsed as healthy and exempted
from credit ceilings. These same
criteria were applied for determining
banks that qualify to participate in the
official foreign exchange market.
An intriguing element of Nigeria's
foreign exchange market was the
irregularity in policy implementation.
The reform of the foreign exchange
market for instance started in 1986
with the abrogation of exchange
controls and establishment of a
market-based autonomous foreign
exchange market, including the
licensing of Bureaux de change in
1988. However, a fixed official
exchange rate existed alongside the
autonomous market. In 1993 the
plodding market-based depreciation
in the official exchange rate was
abridged by a sharp devaluation in a
bid to close the gap between the
official and the autonomous exchange
rate. Discontented with the gap
between the official and autonomous
exchange rates, government
prohibited the autonomous foreign
exchange market and reintroduced
exchange controls in 1994. But after a
full year of exchange controls, the
autonomous market was reintroduced
in 1995. A foreign exchange subsidy of
about 300 per cent, representing the
gap between the official and
autonomous market rates existed for
some government-preferred
consumption, including pilgrimage
and sporting events. The continued
operation of the official exchange rate
exerted distortions in the domestic
allocation of resources in the public
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sector. Fiscal gains thus appear to be
an incentive factor in retaining the
current structure of the foreign
exchange market. A similar pattern of
policy somersault was apparent in the
interest rate reforms policy. First
introduced in 1987, the marketdetermined interest rates operated
until 1991 when interest rates were
capped. However, a year after,
deregulation of interest rates policy
was once again re-introduced in 1992
and 1993. Although indirect monetary
instruments (open market operations)
were initiated in 1993, some
measures of controls such as sectoral
credit allocation guidelines continued
to be applied in 1994.
Regarding bank licensing and
regulation, the reform commenced
with the deregulation of bank licensing
in 1987. This resulted in the
establishment of many new banks.
However, when prudential measures
such as, the increase in the required
banks paid up capital in 1989 and the
reform of their accounting procedure
(1990) appeared insufficient to
restrain the immoderation of the
sector, government placed total
embargo on bank licensing in 1991.
Privatization of banks was suspended
after applying the measure to a few
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banks. Some of the issues highlighted
above point to the disorderly manner
in which the reform has been
implemented in Nigeria. Thus,
Nigeria's financial sector reform has
not been a smooth sailing process.
This in itself could obscure the
appraisal as well as its outcome.
4.0

IMPACT OF FINANCIAL
SECTOR REFORMS ON
SAVINGS IN NIGERIA.
A fascinating exercise is to assess the
effects of liberalization on the
measures of financial development
that in turn are regarded as correlating
with economic growth. Development
of the financial sector requires a set of
indicators that can be used for
e ff e c t i v e p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n ,
implementation and evaluation. As
such, there is no precise definition in
the literature of 'financial sector
development'. However Fry (1978)
observes that the key to financial
sector development is the reduction,
and ultimately unification, of the
fragmented financial markets. This
involves a complete set of indicators
mainly covering credit intermediation,
liquidity management and the risk
management characteristics of the
financial system. Goldsmith (1969)

used a set of measures, which he
called the 'financial interrelations
ratio', in tracing the close relationship
between the financial sector and
economic development. In many
other studies, the ratio of the broad
money (M2) to GDP is taken to
observe the changes in the size of the
financial system relative to the size of
the economy.
It is hard to find 'an indicator' that can
directly measure the development of
the financial sector. We therefore
analyse the roles of the indicators that
are studied in the recent literature and
then choose ten indicators that
encompass all the qualities of a welldeveloped financial sector. The six
measures are explained as follows:
Broad Money as a ratio of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), Private
Credit as a ratio of GDP, Currency
Outside Bank as a ratio of Broad
Money (M2), Interest Rate Spread,
Real Interest Rate, and Gross
Savings as a ratio of GDP. The data for
the analysis were essentially sourced
from the central bank of Nigeria. The
assessment period is broken into two
segments 1980-1986 representing
the pre-reforms era, while 1987-2005
represents the post reforms era.

TABLE 1: FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS INDICATORS IN NIGERIA: 1980-2005
Pre-Reforms
1980-1986

Post-Reforms
1987-2005

M2/GDP (%)

26.7

22.8

Private Sector Credit/GDP

16.8

14.4

Currency outside Bank/M2
Interest Rate Spread
Real Interest Rate
Gross Savings/GDP
20

23.0
1.8
-8.1
7.1

25.7
10.7
-15.5
12.6
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One of the expected effects of
financial sector liberalisation
according to theory and some
empirical findings is what have been
known in the liberalisation literature as
Financial Deepening, usually
measured as the ratio of broad money
to the GDP. In Nigeria the ratio
worsened from 26.7 per cent in the
pre-reform era to 22.8 per cent in the
reform era. This clearly indicated that
financial sector reforms in Nigeria did
not achieve the purpose of financial
deepening that is purported by theory.
This outcome is consistent with the
findings of Nissanke and Aryeetey
(1998) who observed that expected
positive effects from liberalisation, in
savings mobilisation and credit
allocation had been slow to emerge.
The use of both the M2/GDP ratio and
the private credit/GDP ratio to
measure financial deepening showed
no clear upward trend in any of those
countries. In Nigeria, both indicators
worsened considerably in the reform
period. Indeed, in most countries,
credit as a proportion of GDP declined
in the reform years, even if the share
of credit to the private sector rose.
The ratio of credit to the private sector
to GDP has been classified as a
measurement of financial sector
widening (De Gregorio and Guidotti
(1993). Thus, the higher the ratio the
more widened the financial sector is
assumed to be. The reasoning
underpinning such assumption is that
the private sector utilisation of credit is
usually more efficient than the
government sector. In the pre-reform
period, the ratio stood at 16.8 per cent.
However the ratio deteriorated to 14.4
per cent during the post reform era,
indicating relative narrowing of the
financial sector in Nigeria. This is very
instructive as it contradicts the muchtouted impact of Nigeria's financial
sector in economic development.
Confirming what some researchers,
including Onwioduokit, (2002) refers
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to as nominal growth in the numbers
of banks that did not affect the
financial sector positively, much less
the economy.
This ratio measures cash intensity in
the economy. One of the expected
gains of the financial sector
liberalisation was the development of
the financial system that would
improve banking habits and by
extension the development of the
payments system. The performance
of the Nigeria's financial reforms
under this criterion indicated a
deteriorating trend. During the prereform period, this ratio was 23.04 per
cent. This performance was broadly in
line with the Africa average of 23.5 per
cent by 1985. However, post
liberalisation ratio at 25.71 per cent in
2003 did not only indicate a worsening
trend compared to the preliberalisation level but was also more
out of line with Africa's average of 22.5
per cent in 2003 than in 1985 (see
Lindgren and Odonye, 2003). Overall,
the results showed that cash intensity
in Nigeria in 2003 was more severe
than in 1985. The worsening trend
could also be adduced to central bank
of Nigeria's policy of introducing
higher currency denominations
supposedly to keep pace with
inflation. Indeed between 1985 and
2003, about four different higher naira
denominations ranging from N50 to
N500 were introduced. Furthermore
the absence of relevant legal
regulations to which issues such as
dud cheques, until very recently could
have contributed to the observed
outcome.
The financial sector reforms and
liberalization was expected to narrow
the spread between deposit and
lending rate as a result of competition
that was expected to ensue in the
financial sector. The interest rate
spread (lending savings margins)
has been dramatically high in Nigeria
58

in the post reform period than in the
pre- reforms era. The prevalence of
very high lending rates and systematic
increase in the lending-deposit rate
margins in the post reforms period is
essentially unacceptable. Under the
reform programmes, an initial
increase in the spread between
lending and deposit rates was
expected, as banks needed time to
adjust their cost structures during the
changing environment. The spread
was expected to narrow as more
efficient business practices were
embraced sequence to increasing
competition and as credit demand
stabilised. But more than a decade
after reforms were started, the spread
between the two continue to widen in
Nigeria. The problem of continual
increases in lending rates and low
deposit rates during the post reform
period is one of the most attentiongrabbing effects of financial sector
reforms in Nigeria. For instance the
spread widened by over 8.9
percentage points on the average
from 1.8 per cent during the prereforms period to 10.7 per cent in the
post reform period.
Real Interest Rate
Real interest rate is usually used to
proxy the efficiency of financial
intermediation. Financial liberalization
is expected to deliver higher real
interest rates, reflecting the allocation
of capital toward more productive,
higher return projects owing to a shift
to more productive uses of financial
resources and enhanced financial
intermediation. However in Nigeria
the average real interest rate
deteriorated from negative 8.1 per
cent during the pre-liberalisation
period to negative 15.5 per cent during
the post liberalisation era. Thus during
both pre and post liberalisation era in
Nigeria, the real interest rate were
negative, reflecting the high rate of
inflation associated with fiscal
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prolificacy of the military government
that dominated most of the period of
both pre and post liberalisation in
Nigeria. However the post
liberalisation era as noted earlier
recorded a worsening trend than the
pre liberalisation period.
Gross Savings as a ratio of GDP
Gross savings as a ratio of GDP is a
direct measure of savings
mobilisation in an economy. It is
expected that the ratio should improve
with improvement in financial
intermediation activity of the financial
system. On the average the ratio was
7.12 per cent in the control period, but
improved to 12.62 per cent during the
deregulation era. This was one of the
few dividends of deregulation of the
financial system in Nigeria.
5 . 0

S U M M A RY
CONCLUSSION

A N D

The main objective of this paper was
to assess the impact of financial
sector reforms in Nigeria, especially
on the development of the financial
sector. Accordingly, this paper dwells
on theoretical issues and brief review
of literature and presented a brief
analysis of financial sector reforms in
Nigeria. Attempt was also made to
assess the impact of the reforms. The
paper analyzed the roles of the
indicators that are studied in the
recent literature. Ten indicators that
encompass all the qualities of a welldeveloped financial sector were
selected to measure the impact of
financial sector deregulation on the
economy. The six measures included:
Broad Money as a ratio of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), Private
Credit as a ratio of GDP, Currency
Outside Bank as a ratio of Broad
Money (M2), Interest Rate Spread,

Real Interest Rate, and Gross
Savings as a ratio of the data for the
analysis were essentially sourced
from the central bank of Nigeria. The
assessment period is broken into two
segments 1980-1986 representing
the pre-reforms era, while 1987-2003
represents the post reforms era. The
assessment based on the chosen
indices showed that Nigeria's financial
sector reforms only impacted
positively on two out of the ten
indicators compared with the prereforms era.
A battery of explanations has been
advanced for the obvious failure of
financial liberalisation programmes to
address the problems of Nigeria's
financial system. The most recurrent
rationalization is the incompleteness
of the reforms. It is argued that the
persistent poor financial performance
was due to lack of progress on some
of the reform measures. Blame was
placed on the continued use of
financial systems to finance public
sector activities, which was made
possible by the continuing public
sector ownership of a large part of the
financial system (World Bank, 1994).
Soyibo (1996) opines that improper
pace and sequencing in the initial
reform years led to the crisis and
eventual collapse of the financial
system, necessitating several policy
reversals in Nigeria. The crisis made
policy consistency and credibility
critical issues. It is obvious that
Nigeria's difficulty in sustaining a
consistent policy stance was partly
attributable to unstable general
economic and political conditions.
Stein and Lewis (1996) have ascribed
the failure of financial liberalisation in
Nigeria largely to the political and
institutional setting of reforms. The
argument for this position is that the
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abrupt financial liberalisation led to the
development of opportunities for
speculative rent seeking that replaced
traditional forms of rent-seeking that
are based on political patronage. In
sum, the faulty design of the reform
programme, with respect to timing,
pace and sequencing led to instability.
World Bank (1994) notes that
complete interest-rate deregulation
should only be attempted when
certain stern criteria are satisfied.
Thus, in addition to stable
macroeconomic conditions and
adequate regulatory and supervisory
arrangement, it is important that more
sophisticated and solvent banking
institutions with positive net worth in
contestable financial markets are
present. It is expected that interest
rate deregulation will be ineffective
where these conditions are not met. In
the absence of such an environment,
interest rates may be managed in the
interim, moving to market-determined
rates within a longer time frame.
In conclusion it is obvious that the
financial system will continue to
flourish without adequately affecting
the real economy even in the era of
deregulation if the banks in particular,
continue to trade in foreign exchange
and finance trading activities at the
expense of the manufacturing sector.
Again the fiscal operation of
government that resulted in persistent
deficits mainly financed by the central
bank in most of the liberalisation era
that resulted in very high inflation,
adversely affected macroeconomic
stability, setting in motion a vicious
cycle of external and internal
imbalances. The consolidation of the
banking system currently embarked
upon by the central bank should be
pursued to a logical conclusion if the
financial sector in Nigeria is to develop
appropriately.
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